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This study considers a supply chain that consists of n retailers, each of them facing a newsvendor prob-
lem, and a supplier. Groups of retailers might increase their expected joint proﬁt by joint ordering and
inventory centralization. However, we assume that the retailers impose some level of stock that should
be dedicated to them. In this situation, we show that the associated cooperative game has a non-empty
core. Afterwards, we concentrate on a dynamic situation, where several model cost parameters and the
retailers’ dedicated stock levels can change. We investigate how the proﬁt division might be affected by
these changes. We focus on four monotonicity properties. We identify several classes of games with
retailers, where some of the monotonicity properties hold. Moreover, we show that pairs of cooperative
games associated with newsvendor situations do not necessarily satisfy these properties in general, when
changes in dedicated stock levels are in concern.
 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider a distribution system that consists of
a supplier and n independent retailers, each facing a stochastic de-
mand. Each retailer solves a single period problem (newsvendor
problem), i.e., at the start of the period, every retailer determines
his order quantity that maximizes his expected proﬁt anticipating
that, after the products are delivered to the retailers, demands are
realized and satisﬁed from the stock as much as possible. In this
network, we study the inventory pooling coalitions in which the
retailers can jointly invest in a common pool of inventory to be
allocated after demand realization. In a speciﬁc cooperation sce-
nario, we study the stability of these coalitions in static and dy-
namic settings.
Beneﬁts of inventory pooling, i.e., cost savings and proﬁt in-
crease, have been studied in different inventory settings (Eppen,
1979; Eppen and Schrage, 1981; Chen and Lin, 1989; Chang and
Lin, 1991; Cherikh, 2000). These early studies assume single own-
ership of the system. Individual ﬁrms, however, are especially
interested in what they can get for themselves from inventory cen-
tralization. Several other papers have investigated the allocation of
beneﬁts (reduced cost or increased proﬁt) problem and proposed
several mechanisms. For instance, Gerchak and Gupta (1991) com-
pared four simple allocation mechanisms and showed that only
one of them guarantees lower cost for every store than itsElsevier B.V.
. Özen), nesim@bilkent.edu.trstand-alone cost. Robinson (1993) extended their analysis to other
allocation mechanisms, i.e., the Shapley value (cf. Shapley, 1953)
and the Lounderback allocation (Lounderback, 1976). Hartman
and Dror (1996) examined allocation mechanisms for this setting
using three criteria. These are core non-emptiness, computational
ease and justiﬁability. The core concept, a measure of stability,
has also received special interest by several other papers and the
core non-emptiness has been shown for different newsvendor set-
tings: newsvendors with a common pool of inventory (Hartman et
al., 2000; Müller et al., 2002; Slikker et al., 2001), and newsvendors
with lateral transshipment or multiple channels of supply (Slikker
et al., 2005; Özen et al., 2008; Chen and Zhang, 2009). All of these
studies assume complete pooling of inventory, i.e., inventory can
be diverted to satisfy demand that creates the highest proﬁt from
any stock point. However, the beneﬁts of pooling of stock can also
be seen in restrictive settings. Anupindi et al. (2001) considered a
distribution system where the retailers keep local inventory. After
satisfying their local demand, the retailers cooperate by transship-
ping excess inventory in one location to satisfy excess demand in
another location. They derived a proﬁt sharing mechanism based
on dual prices of the optimal shipping problem after demand real-
ization, which is a core element and leads to joint optimal orders
being an equilibrium. The model of Anupindi et al. (2001) is ex-
tended in several directions by Granot and Sošic´ (2003) and Sošic´
(2006).
In this paper, we do not consider a complete consolidation of
inventories when the retailers cooperate. Instead, we assume that
the retailers invest in a common pool of inventory but each retailer
asks a minimum amount of inventory to be dedicated for him,
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good. However, in case of low demand realization, the retailers re-
lease not needed inventory for other retailers’ use. There could be
several possible reasons for the retailer to impose such minimum
level of dedicated inventories:
 Ensure income from operations: In a high selling session, it is a
main tendency of a cooperation to provide the more proﬁtable
markets with the majority of the available goods in order to
increase total system proﬁt. This behavior may leave the other
markets with insufﬁcient stock. To survive in the local market
and preserve marketing strength, a retailer may want to stay
active in the industry. A dedicated quantity guarantees the retai-
ler to receive an income from the business to support his inside
operations (instead of being compensated only at the end of the
selling period) and continue to be active in the market.
 Ensure local competitive power: The retailers might be in quan-
tity competition in their local market and require a certain level
of dedicated inventory to stay competitive.
 Ensure some customer service level: Another important factor
in surviving in the market is customer satisfaction. Using mini-
mum level of dedicated inventory, the retailer can ensure a rea-
sonable customer service level.
We are ﬁrst interested in the stability of this type of cooperation
and focus on the core concept as many papers in the literature (see
Hartman et al., 2000; Müller et al., 2002; Slikker et al., 2001; Slikker
et al., 2005; Özen et al., 2008). The core concept considers a natural
criterion for stability that is each retailer should do better in the coa-
lition than pursuing any of their alternatives, i.e., working alone or
forming another coalition. In this research, we work with the core
concept. However, we carry the stability notion a step further and
we are interested in a stability measure that considers the effects
of changes in the environment. In our case, the retailers in such
coalitions will be interested in the form of the cooperation when a
change in the environmentoccurs. The retailers should feel that they
are not discriminated or deceived under such a situation. In other
words, a new core distribution of the expected total proﬁt that does
not discriminate against any of the retailers with respect to the ori-
ginal proﬁt division is desired. The core is a strong concept that en-
sures stability in the given framework, however has less to saywhen
there is a different framework following the original. Note that dis-
tributing the total proﬁt using a core element is strong enough for
the stability of the cooperation in the changed situation as well.
However, we would like to analyze some further fairness criteria,
which the retailers would naturally consider knowing the new divi-
sion of total proﬁt. Even in the situationwhere these fairness criteria
are hard to satisfy, developing an understanding is important for the
continuation of the close relations, which is critical for coordinated
decision making and, hence, for the success of cooperation.
In general, monotonicity notions from cooperative game theory
can be used to address this issue. Several papers study monotonic-
ity in TU-games. Megiddo (1974) and Young (1985) studied aggre-
gate monotonicity and coalitional monotonicity, respectively.
Young (1985) also showed that no core allocation mechanisms
can be coalitionally monotonic on coalitional games with 5 or more
players. Afterwards Housman and Clark (1998) extended this re-
sult to games with 4 players. Sasaki (1995) and Nunez and Rafels
(2002) analyzed monotonicity in assignment games. None of the
monotonicity properties studied above, however, covers the cases
that we analyze in this paper. Ichiishi (1981) introduced three wel-
fare criteria on the core of the games and he established necessary
and sufﬁcient conditions for the criteria to be satisﬁed. Two of
those criteria represent a fairness argument we like to study in this
paper. We discuss this issue in more detail when we introduce four
monotonicity properties in Section 2.2.The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2.1 gives prelim-
inaries on cooperative game theory. In Section 2.2, we introduce 4
monotonicity properties and derive several sufﬁcient conditions.
Section 3.1 introduces the newsvendor situations with dedicated
stock and the associated cooperative games. Moreover, we focus
on the existence of stable proﬁt distributions, which is shown by
proving that these games have non-empty cores. In Section 3.2,
we investigate the cases, where the retailers’ parameters for coop-
eration are changed, e.g., changes in the dedicated stock levels,
selling prices, purchasing cost and penalty cost, which affect the
outcome of the coalition. We identify two types of changes. In
the ﬁrst one, all retailers’ parameters are changed, and in the latter
single retailer’s parameters are changed. We focus on the issue of
whether we can ﬁnd a core distribution of total proﬁt for the
new situation, which does not discriminate against any of the
retailers. This issue is captured by the 4 monotonicity properties
introduced in Section 2.2. In Section 3.2.1, we identify several clas-
ses of newsvendor games where two of the monotonicity proper-
ties hold regarding the changes in selling price, purchasing cost
and penalty cost. In Section 3.2.2, we analyze the monotonicity
properties under changes in retailers’ dedicated stock levels. After
providing examples that none of the properties are guaranteed to
hold for cooperative games associated with newsvendor situations,
we focus on a class of newsvendor games for which one of the
monotonicity properties holds. We conclude our paper in Section
4 with ﬁnal remarks. The proofs that are not presented in the main
body of the paper can be found in the online appendix.
2. Preliminaries and monotonicity
2.1. Preliminaries
In this section, we give a brief introduction to cooperative game
theory and introduce some notation. Let N be a ﬁnite set of players,
N = {1, . . . ,n}. A subset of N is called a coalition. A function v, assign-
ing a value v(S) to every coalition S # N with v(;) = 0, is called a
characteristic function. The value v(S) is interpreted as the maxi-
mum total proﬁt that coalition S can obtain through cooperation.
Assuming that the beneﬁt of a coalition S can be transferred among
the players of S, a pair (N,v) is called a cooperative game with trans-
ferable utility (TU-game). For a game (N,v), S  N and S– ;, the sub-
game (S,vjS) is deﬁned by vjS(T) = v(T) for each coalition T # S.
In reality, the players are not primarily interested in beneﬁts of
a coalition but in their individual beneﬁts that they make out of
that coalition. A division is a payoff vector y ¼ ðyiÞi2N 2 RN , specify-
ing for each player i 2 N the beneﬁt yi. A division y is called efﬁcient
if
P
i2Nyi ¼ vðNÞ and individually rational if yiP v({i}) for all i 2 N.
Individual rationality means that every player gets at least as much
as what he could obtain by staying alone. The set of all individually
rational and efﬁcient divisions constitutes the imputation set:
IðvÞ ¼ y 2 RN j
X
i2N
yi ¼ vðNÞ and yi P vðfigÞ for each i 2 N
( )
:
If these rationality requirements are extended to all coalitions, we
obtain the core:
CoreðvÞ ¼ y 2 RNj
X
i2N
yi ¼ vðNÞ and
(
X
i2S
yi P vðSÞ for each S#N
)
:
Thus, the core consists of all imputations in which no group of play-
ers has an incentive to split off from the grand coalition N and form
a smaller coalition, because they collectively receive at least as
much as what they can obtain by cooperating on their own. Note
that the core of a game can be empty.
418 U. Özen et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 218 (2012) 416–425Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) independently made a
general characterization of games with a non-empty core by the
notion of balancedness. Let us deﬁne the vector eS for all S # N
by eSi ¼ 1 for all i 2 S and eSi ¼ 0 for all i 2 NnS. A map
j:2Nn{;}? [0,1] is called a balanced map if PS22Nnf;gjðSÞeS ¼ eN .
Further, a game (N,v) is called balanced if for every balanced map
j:2Nn{;}? [0,1] it holds thatPS22Nnf;gjðSÞvðSÞ 6 vðNÞ. The follow-
ing theorem is due to Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967).
Theorem 1. Let (N,v) be a TU-game. Then Core(v)– ; if and only if
(N,v) is balanced.
A TU-game (N,v) is called totally balanced if it is balanced and
each of its subgames is balanced as well.
One important property a game might satisfy is convexity. A
game (N,v) is called convex if for all i 2 N and all S, T # Nn{i} with
S  T,
vðT [ figÞ  vðTÞP vðS [ figÞ  vðSÞ
Hence, for convex games, the marginal contribution of a player to
any coalition is greater than his marginal contribution to a smaller
coalition. A game is strictly convex if all inequalities are strict. We re-
mark that convex games have non-empty cores.
2.2. Monotonicity
In this section, we introduce four monotonicity properties to
capture two fair arguments for a general class of games. These
monotonicity properties will be used further to investigate long
term stability of the inventory pooling coalitions under changes.
Consider two games (N,v) and (N,w). We call the triple (N,v,w) a
pair of games if both games are totally balanced and
vðSÞP wðSÞ for all S#N:
We call game (N,v), which has larger values, the larger game and
game (N,w), which has smaller values, the smaller game. In a news-
vendor environment, larger games represent collaboration in favor-
able conditions (e.g., high selling prices and low purchasing costs)
whereas smaller games might result from a situation with restric-
tive conditions for possible coalitions (e.g., low selling prices and
high purchasing costs).
The ﬁrst fairness argument states that if the values of the coali-
tions in a game increase (decrease), it is possible that no player
gets less (more) than before. Ichiishi (1990) introduces the follow-
ing two monotonicity properties capturing this fairness argument.
 MP1: The pair of games (N,v,w) has monotonicity property 1
(MP1) if for all y 2 Core(w) there exists an x 2 Core(v) such that
xP y.
 MP2: The pair of games (N,v,w) has monotonicity property 2
(MP2) if for all x 2 Core(v) there exists a y 2 Core(w) such that
y 6 x.
If a pair of games has MP1 (MP2), then for all core elements of
the smaller (larger) game, there is a core element of the larger
(smaller) game such that no player gets less (more) than before.
We remark that we want the new payoff vectors to be in the core,
since those are stable. Moreover, we do not consider any speciﬁc
bargaining process which will determine a mechanism to share
the total expected proﬁt and assume that any core element can
be a feasible outcome for the grand coalition since all core ele-
ments are stable. Therefore, we check the entire core of game w
(v) for MP1 (MP2).
Consider two games (N,v) and (N,w). We call the tuple (N,v,w, i)
a single deviation pair of games if both games are totally balanced
and i is a player in N such that v(S)P w(S) for all S containing i
and v(S) = w(S) for all S not containing i. We call player i thedeviating player. Regarding to cooperative games associated with
newsvendor situations, the deviating player represents the retailer,
whose system parameters has changed. The second fairness argu-
ment states that if the value change of the coalitions is caused by
one player, the other players should not get less than before. Be-
sides, the deviating player should not get less either if its deviation
improves these values. We introduce the following two monoto-
nicity property to capture this fairness argument.
 MP3: The single deviation pair of games (N,v,w, i) has monoto-
nicity property 3 (MP3) if for all y 2 Core(w) there exists an
x 2 Core(v) such that xiP yi and xjP yj for all j 2 Nn{i}.
 MP4: The single deviation pair of games (N,v,w, i) has monoto-
nicity property 4 (MP4) if for all x 2 Core(v) there exists a
y 2 Core(w) such that yi 6 xi and yjP xj for all j 2 Nn{i}.
Similar as for MP1 and MP2, we check the entire core of game w
(v) for MP3 (MP4).
Note that monotonicity properties MP1 and MP3 differ from
each other only because MP3 is deﬁned for a special class of pairs
of games, i.e., single deviation pair of games.
We use the following theorems to study the monotonicity of
newsvendor games. The following theorem states that a pair of
games with up to 3 players satisﬁes MP1 if the value of the grand
coalition N increases more than any other coalition S  N. The
proof is presented in the online appendix.Theorem 2. Let (N,v,w) be a pair of games with jNj 6 3. If
v(N)  w(N) P v(S)  w(S) for all S # N, then (N,v,w) has MP1.
However, this result does not hold for pairs of games with arbi-
trary number of players. A counterexample can be found in Özen
(2007).
The next theorem states that MP2 is naturally satisﬁed by pairs
of games consisting of games with 2 players.
Theorem 3. Let (N,v,w) be a pair of games such that jNj 6 2. Then
the pair of games (N,v,w) has MP2.Proof. The case with jNj = 1 is trivial. Assume N = {1,2}. Consider
another game (N,v0) such that
v 0ðf1;2gÞ ¼ vðf1;2gÞ; v 0ðf1gÞ ¼ wðf1gÞ; and v 0ðf2gÞ ¼ wðf2gÞ:
Since v0(S) = w(S) 6 v(S) for all S  N and v0(N) = v(N), Core(v)
# Core(v0). Let x be in the core of (N,v). Then, x 2 Core(v0). Therefore,
we can express x as a convex combination of the extreme points of
Core(v0). Let (k1,k2) be such that x = k1(v0({1}), v0({1,2})  v0({1}))
+ k2(v0({1,2})  v0({2}), v0({2})) with k1 2 [0,1] and k2 = 1  k1. So
x = k1(w({1}), v({1,2})  w({1})) + k2(v({1,2})  w({2}), w({2})). Con-
sider the division y = k1(w({1}), w({1,2}) w({1})) + k2(w({1,2})
w({2}),w({2})). Since y is given by a convex combination of the ex-
treme points of Core(w), y 2 Core(w). Furthermore, since (w({1}),
w({1,2}) w({1})) 6 (w({1}), v({1,2}) w({1})) and (w({1,2}) 
w({2}), w({2})) 6 (v({1,2}) w({2}),w({2})), we derive that y 6 x.
This completes the proof. h
However, this result does not extend to pairs of games with at
least three players. Özen (2007) provides a counterexample.
The following two theorems give sufﬁcient conditions for pairs
of games with an arbitrary number of players to satisfy MP1 and
MP2. They are due to Theorems 2.6 and 2.11 in Ichiishi (1990).
Alternative proofs can be found in Özen (2007).
Theorem 4. Let (N,v,w) be a pair of games. If (N,v) is a convex game
and v(N)  w(N)P v(S)  w(S) for all S # N, then (N,v,w) has MP1.
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then (N,v,w) has MP2.
The following two theorems give sufﬁcient conditions for MP3
and MP4, which are useful for case by case analysis.
Theorem 6. Let (N,v,w, i) be a single deviation pair of games. If
v(N)  w(N)P v(S)  w(S) for all S such that i 2 S and S  N, then
(N,v,w, i) has MP3.Proof. Suppose that v(N)  w(N)P v(S)  w(S) for all S such that
i 2 S and S  N. Recall that v(S) = w(S) for all S # Nn{i} since
(N,v,w, i) is a singleton deviating pair of games. Let y 2 Core(w),
and let K = v(N)  w(N). Consider the payoff vector x with xj = yj
for all j 2 Nn{i} and xi = yi + K. Then
P
j2Sxj ¼
P
j2Syj P wðSÞ ¼ vðSÞ
for all S#N n fig;Pj2Sxj ¼Pj2Syj þ K P wðSÞ þ K P vðSÞ for all
S  N with i 2 S, and Pj2Nxj ¼Pj2Nyj þ K ¼ wðNÞ þ K ¼ vðNÞ.
Hence, x 2 Core(v). Furthermore, xiP yi and xj P yj for all j 2 Nn{i}.
This completes the proof. hTheorem 7. Let (N,v,w, i) be a single deviation pair of games. If
v(N)  w(N) 6 v(S)  w(S) for all S such that i 2 S and S  N, then
(N,v,w, i) has MP4.Proof. Suppose that v(N)  w(N) 6 v(S)  w(S) for all S such that
i 2 S and S  N. Recall that v(S) = w(S) for all S # Nn{i} since
(N,v,w, i) is a singleton deviating pair of games. Let x 2 Core(v),
and let K = v(N)  w(N). Consider the payoff vector y with yj = xj
for all j 2 Nn{i} and yi = xi  K. Then
P
j2Syj ¼
P
j2Sxj P vðSÞ ¼ wðSÞ
for all S#N n fig;Pj2Syj ¼Pj2Sxj  K P vðSÞ  K P wðSÞ for all
S  N with i 2 S, and Pj2Nyj ¼Pj2Nxj  K ¼ vðNÞ  K ¼ wðNÞ.
Hence, y 2 Core(w). Furthermore, yi 6 xi and yj P xj for all j 2 Nn{i}.
This completes the proof. h
Table 1 summarizes the sufﬁcient conditions presented in The-
orems 2–7. Note that the conditions are valid for the class of totally
balanced games including the newsvendor games.
In this research, we use the monotonicity properties as an
instrument to determine the long term stability for cooperation
in a newsvendor setting which is subject to changes in the environ-
ment (e.g., changing dedicated stock levels, prices and cost param-
eters). In our situation, determining a new core allocation, which
does not discriminate against any of the retailers, is favorable for
the retailers. Even though it might not be possible in all situations,
studying these monotonicity properties is important to develop an
understanding about what the retailers can or cannot expect fromTable 1
Sufﬁcient conditions for MP1, MP2, MP3 and MP4.
MP1
jNj 6 3 (Theorem 2) v(N)  w(N)P v(S)  w(S) for all S # N
Arbitrary number of players
(Theorem 4)
v(N)  w(N)P v(S)  w(S) for all S # N and
v is convex
MP2
jNj 6 2 (Theorem 3) No condition required
Arbitrary number of players
(Theorem 5)
w is convex
MP3 (i is the deviating player)
Arbitrary number of players
(Theorem 6)
v(N)  w(N)P v(S)  w(S) for all S # N
with i 2 S
MP4 (i is the deviating player)
Arbitrary number of players
(Theorem 7)
v(N)  w(N) 6 v(S)  w(S) for all S # N
with i 2 Sthe cooperation to secure their further participation to the cooper-
ation and coordinated decision making. In the remainder of the pa-
per, we study stability and monotonicity of newsvendor games,
mainly focusing on MP1 and MP2. We identify several classes of
newsvendor games satisfying these properties with the help of
the sufﬁcient conditions derived in this section. Although we do
not study MP3 and MP4 extensively in the rest of the paper, the
sufﬁcient conditions derived here are easy to check and can be
used in case by case analysis of newsvendor situations.
3. Model and analysis
3.1. Model
In this section, we introduce newsvendor situations with dedi-
cated stock and deﬁne the associated cooperative games. Then, we
show that these games have non-empty cores. Recall that missing
proofs of theorems and lemmas can be found in the online
appendix.
Consider a set N = {1, . . . ,n} of retailers selling the same product.
Each retailer i 2 N experiences a stochastic demand Xi with ﬁnite
expectation and has to give an order to the same supplier before
the demand realization.1 Moreover, each retailer i 2 N has a unit
cost ci, which includes purchasing and transportation costs, a selling
price pi and a penalty cost gi. Throughout the study, we assume that
pi, ci and gi are positive, and piP ci for all i 2 N. Besides, different
from the standard newsvendor model, each retailer would like to
satisfy his own demand up to a certain amount for sure. This amount
is denoted by ei for retailer i 2 N. If realized demand is less than this
amount, then the whole demand is critical and the retailer would
like to satisfy it all. We call ei the dedicated stock level of retailer i.
In single newsvendor setting, the dedicated stock level can be seen
as the minimum order quantity for a retailer to meet a certain ser-
vice level. A tuple (N, (Xi)i2N, (ci)i2N, (pi)i2N, (gi)i2N, (ei)i2N) with N,Xi,ci, -
pi,gi and ei as above is called a newsvendor situation with dedicated
stock. For convenience, we will, in the rest of the paper, refer to
newsvendor situations with dedicated stock simply as newsvendor
situations. We remark that in this model the retailers concerns about
losing a customer demand is reﬂected by two parameters; penalty
cost gi and dedicated stock level ei. Hence, this model is rich enough
to cover two speciﬁc settings; one with gi = 0 for all i 2 N, and one
with ei = 0 for all i 2 N. Moreover, if the retailers join a coalition,
the dedicated stock levels also reﬂect the retailers’ concerns about
the allocation of the joint order quantity after demand realization.
Consider a newsvendor situation and a collection of retailers S.
If these retailers come together and form coalition S, they might in-
crease their total proﬁt by giving a joint order and splitting it after
demand realization. Such a joint order qS should not create any
infeasibility for coalition S with respect to the dedicated stock lev-
els of the retailers in S, i.e., qS P
P
i2Sei. The collection of possible
orders of coalition S is given by
QS :¼ q 2 RjqP
X
i2S
ei
( )
:
Let (xi)i2S be a realization of demand vector XS = (Xi)i2S. For nota-
tional convenience, we will denote this realization as the vector
xS 2 RN where xSi ¼ 0 for all i 2 NnS and xSi ¼ xi for all i 2 S. Suppose
coalition S has ordered qS 2 QS and demands are realized as xS. Then
the retailers in S can allocate the joint order among themselves to
satisfy the demands. An allocation of qS is a vector aS 2 RNþ with1 In most practical applications Xi can not take negative values. However, in this
work we allow Xi to take negative values with very low probabilities to cover some
well known distributions (e.g., normal distribution). Besides, negative demand can be
interpreted as returns from customers.
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i2S
aSi ¼ qS;
aSi Pminfxi; eig for all i 2 S:
Here, aSi denotes the amount of product that will be sent from the
supplier to retailer i. The set of all possible allocations for coalition
S of an order vector qS 2 QS is denoted by MS(qS,xS). Note that it is
not allowed to ship goods to retailers that are not in coalition S.
Moreover, an allocation should satisfy aSi P min xi; eif g for each re-
tailer i 2 S since each retailer wants to utilize his dedicated stock
when the demand is high. We remark that, since the actual alloca-
tion of the joint order takes place after demand realization, retailer i
can possibly get less than ei if xi 6 ei to improve the proﬁt of the coa-
lition. Finally, we assume that at the end of the period all ordered
units should be transferred to the retailers. This assumption can
be interpreted as the opportunity to salvage the leftover products
is only available or more beneﬁcial at the retailers.2
For a ﬁxed order quantity qS 2 QS, demand realization xS of XS,
and allocation vector aS 2MS(qS,xS) the proﬁt of coalition S can be
expressed as
PSðaS; qS; xSÞ ¼ 
X
i2S
aSi ci þ
X
i2S
ðpi þ giÞmin aSi ; xSi
 X
i2S
gix
S
i :
Note that in the proﬁt function, we do not consider any extra cost
for the allocation of the joint order. This is natural for the cases,
where the individual orders of the retailers follow the same route
up to a point. So, if the demand realization occurs before the orders
reach this point, the allocation of the joint order of a coalition can
take place without any additional cost.
The following lemma shows that an optimal allocation exists for
a given coalition, order quantity and demand realization.
Lemma 1. Let (N,(Xi)i2N, (ci)i2N, (pi)i2N, (gi)i2N, (ei)i2N) be a newsvendor
situation, let S # N, let qS 2 QS, and let xS be a demand realization
vector. There exists an allocation aS,⁄ 2MS(qS,xS) that maximizes the
proﬁt PS(, qS,xS) of coalition S.
From now on, we refer to PS(aS,⁄,qS,xS) as rS(qS,xS). The expected
proﬁt function of coalition S is deﬁned by
pSðqSÞ ¼ EXS ½rSðqS; Þ:
The following theorem shows that for any coalition an optimal or-
der quantity, which maximizes expected total proﬁt of this coali-
tion, exists.
Theorem 8. Let (N, (Xi)i2N, (ci)i2N, (pi)i2N, (gi)i2N, (ei)i2N) be a newsven-
dor situation and let S # N. There exists an order quantity qS,⁄ that
maximizes the expected proﬁt function pS() of coalition S.
The determination of an optimal order quantity requires solving
a two stage stochastic program, where in the ﬁrst stage the order
quantity is determined and in the second stage, given the order
quantity and demand realizations, an allocation decision is made.
There exists a solution algorithm, which utilizes backward induc-
tion process.
Let C be a newsvendor situation. The associated cooperative
game (N,vC) is deﬁned by
vCðSÞ ¼ max
qS2QS
pSðqSÞ for all S#N:
The value of a coalition is given by the optimal value of the proﬁt
maximization problem of the coalition. Recall that the optimal or-2 We remark that, in our model, we do not include any salvage value for the
retailers. However, we can incorporate the salvage values vi by deﬁning new selling
prices and costs as pi ¼ pi  v i and ci ¼ ci  v i for all i 2 N.der quantity that maximizes the expected proﬁt function of a coali-
tion S # N is denoted by qS,⁄.
The following theorem shows that cooperative games associ-
ated with newsvendor situations are totally balanced, and hence,
they have non-empty cores.
Theorem 9. Let (N, (Xi)i2N, (ci)i2N,(pi)i2N, (gi)i2N, (ei)i2N) be a newsven-
dor situation. The associated cooperative game is totally balanced and
has a non-empty core.
Chen and Zhang (2009) presented a uniﬁed approach to identify
core elements of inventory centralization games using duality of
two stage stochastic programs. Referring to an earlier version of
this manuscript, Chen and Zhang (2009) also described that their
approach includes the case covered here.
3.2. Monotonicity of newsvendor games
In the previous section, we showed that every cooperative game
associated with a newsvendor situation has a nonempty core,
which provides a stable proﬁt division for the grand coalition un-
der ﬁxed dedicated stock levels of the retailers. Another important
issue to consider is how the payoffs of the retailers are affected by a
change in the system parameters, e.g., dedicated stock levels, pur-
chasing and selling prices, and penalty costs of the retailers.
To investigate this situation, we use the following proposition,
which shows how the value of a coalition is affected by a change
in the system parameters of its retailers. We skip the obvious
proof.
Proposition 1. Let C1 ¼ N; ðXiÞi2N; c1i
 
i2N; p
1
i
 
i2N; g
1
i
 
i2N; e
1
i
 
i2N
 
and C2 ¼ N; ðXiÞi2N ; c2i
 
i2N; p
2
i
 
i2N; g
2
i
 
i2N; e
2
i
 
i2NÞ be two newsven-
dor situations such that e1i 6 e2i ; p1i P p2i ; c1i 6 c2i and g1i 6 g2i for all
i 2 N, and there is a T # N with e1i < e2i andnor p1i > p2i andnor
c1i < c
2
i andnor g1i < g2i for all i 2 T, and e1i ¼ e2i ; p1i ¼ p2i ; c1i ¼ c2i and
g1i ¼ g2i for all i 2 NnT. Then the following relation holds for their
associated games ðN;vC1 Þ and ðN;vC2 Þ:
vC1 ðSÞP vC2 ðSÞ for all S with S\T – ;;
vC1 ðSÞ ¼ vC2 ðSÞ for all S with S\T ¼ ;:
In words, the value of a coalition increases if a group of retailers in
the coalition decreases their dedicated stock levels. Moreover, the
value is increasing with decreasing purchasing and penalty costs,
and increasing selling prices. This result is quite intuitive, since
the possibilities of what a coalition can do are enlarged with lower
dedicated stock levels of the retailers, i.e., the solution space of the
proﬁt maximization problem is enlarged, and the costs and reve-
nues are more favorable in situation C1. Decreasing dedicated stock
levels, purchasing costs and penalty costs as well as increasing sell-
ing prices will be called changes in a positive direction whereas re-
verse adjustments will be called changes in a negative direction.
In newsvendor situations, one might be interested in two types
of changes in the system parameters (e.g., dedicated stock levels
and selling prices). In the ﬁrst one, all retailers’ parameters are
weakly changed simultaneously in either a positive or a negative
direction. This might lead to a change in the value of the grand coa-
lition as well as in the values of some other coalitions as stated in
Proposition 1. Since it is hard to distinguish the effect of retailers
on the change of these values, the simplest fairness argument
states that none of the retailers should get less (more) than before
if the values of the coalitions increase (decrease). In other words,
the payoffs of the retailers should be affected in the same direction
as the game changes due to the change in the system parameters.
Note that we want all proﬁt divisions (before and after a change in
dedicated stock levels) to be stable since we consider it as a
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lyze this type of changes. We remark that if jNj ¼ 2; ðN;vC1 ;vC2 Þ,
which is deﬁned in Proposition 1, has MP2 following from Proposi-
tion 1 and Theorem 3.
In the latter type of change, only a single retailer’s parameter is
changed, which might lead to a change in the value of the grand
coalition as well as in the values of some other coalitions all involv-
ing this player. Since it is known that the changes are caused by
this speciﬁc retailer, other retailers do not want to be harmed by
this change. A fairness argument to follow would be that none of
these non-changing retailers should get less than what they got be-
fore. MP3 and MP4 capture this fairness argument and the sufﬁ-
cient conditions in Theorems 6 and 7 are useful to make a case
by case analysis of newsvendor situations.
3.2.1. Cost parameters
In this part of the study, we study the changes in system cost
parameters, i.e., pi, ci and gi. From Proposition 1, we know how
the value of a coalition changes with a shift in the system cost
parameters. However, knowing the direction (sign) of the change
is not sufﬁcient to ensure the games to satisfy the monotonicity
properties. From the sufﬁcient conditions presented in the prelim-
inaries, we have seen that magnitudes of changes in the values of
coalitions play a critical role. In a newsvendor environment, the
magnitude of the change in the proﬁt of a coalition depends on
the parameters of each retailer (e.g., dedicated stock levels, selling
prices, demand distributions) in the coalition and, hence, can differ
signiﬁcantly from one coalition to another. Therefore, it is very
much parameter dependent whether a pair or a single deviation
pair of newsvendor games satisﬁes the monotonicity properties
or not. In the rest of the section, we assume symmetric retailers
in their selling prices and costs, i.e., pi = p, ci = c and gi = g for all
i 2 N. This is a realistic assumption especially for the situations
where the retailers sell the same product in similar markets. In
these situations, the customers’ perception (or valuation) of the
product does not show many differences in retailers’ markets
and the retailers do not perform any additional value added activ-
ities on the products. We denote a cost symmetric newsvendor sit-
uation (CSNS) byPCSNS = (N, (Xi)i2N,c,p,g, (ei)i2N). Let fS and FS denote
the probability density function and probability distribution func-
tion of XS ¼
P
i2SXi, respectively. In a CSNS, there is no difference in
satisfying demands for different retailers in terms of total proﬁt of
a coalition because of common purchasing cost, selling price and
penalty cost, i.e.,
P
i2S minfaSi ; xSi g ¼ minfqS;
P
i2Sx
S
i g for all S # N.
Therefore, the proﬁt function of coalition S can be written as
follows
pSðqSÞ ¼ c  qS þ p
Z qS
0
FSðxÞdx p
Z 0
1
FSðxÞdx g
Z 1
qS
FSðxÞdx;
where FS ¼ 1 FS. In inventory literature, it is known that pS(q) (the
proﬁt function of newsvendor problem without any dedicated
stock) is a concave function and the optimum qS maximizing this
function satisﬁes FSðqSÞ ¼ 1 c=ðpþ gÞ. Since pS(q) is concave, it fol-
lows immediately that the optimal order quantity of coalition S is
the maximum of the optimal order quantity of the newsvendor
problem without any dedicated stock and the sum of the dedicated
stock levels of the retailers in S, i.e., qS ¼ maxfqS;Pi2Seig. Let
ðN; vPCSNS Þ be the associated newsvendor game. Then, the proﬁt of
coalition S is given by
vPCSNS ðSÞ ¼ c  qS þ p
Z qS
0
FSðxÞdx p
Z 0
1
FSðxÞdx g
Z 1
qS
FSðxÞdx:
Our ﬁrst result is for newsvendor games with two and three
retailers.Theorem 10. Let P1 = (N, (Xi)i2N,c1,p1,g, (ei)i2N) and
P2 = (N, (Xi)i2N,c
2,p2,g, (ei)i2N) with jNj 6 3, Xi 2 [0,1) for all i 2 N,
p1P p2 and c1 6 c2 be two CSNSs. Let ðN;vP1 Þ and ðN;vP2 Þ be the
newsvendor games associated withP1 and P2, respectively. Then, pair
of newsvendor games ðN;vP1 ;vP2 Þ has MP1.Proof. From Theorem 2, it is enough to show that
vP1 ðNÞ  vP2 ðNÞP vP1 ðSÞ  vP2 ðSÞ for all S # N. Consider coalition
S # N. Since Xi 2 [0,1), we know that
FNðyÞ 6 FSðyÞ for all y 2 R: ð1Þ
Deﬁne the following generic proﬁt function
dSðp; cÞ ¼ c  qSðp; cÞ þ p
Z qSðp;cÞ
0
FSðxÞdx g
Z 1
qSðp;cÞ
FSðxÞdx;
where qSðp; cÞ ¼ maxfqS;Pi2Seig such that FSðqSÞ ¼ 1 c=ðpþ gÞ.
Then,
vP1 ðSÞ ¼ dSðp1; c1Þ:
Moreover,
vP1 ðSÞ  vP2 ðSÞ ¼
Z p1
p2
@dSðp; c2Þ
@p

Z c2
c1
@dSðp1; cÞ
@c
:
From the envelope theorem, it follows that
@dSðp; c2Þ
@p
¼
Z qSðp;c2Þ
0
FSðxÞdx and @dSðp
1; cÞ
@c
¼ qSðp1; cÞ:
Then showing that
@dNðp; c2Þ
@p
P
@dSðp; c2Þ
@p
and  @dNðp
1; cÞ
@c
P  @dSðp
1; cÞ
@c
is enough to prove the theorem. Since FNðxÞP FSðxÞ for every
x 2 [0,1) (from (1)) and Pi2Nei PPi2Sei, we know that
qN(p,c2)P qS(p,c2) and qN(p1,c)P qS(p1,c). Therefore, we conclude
that
@dNðp; c2Þ
@p
P
@dSðp; c2Þ
@p
and  @dNðp
1; cÞ
@c
P  @dSðp
1; cÞ
@c
: 
We remark that this result holds under any demand distribution
with nonnegative demand and it covers any correlation structure.
However, a similar result does not hold in general when penalty
costs are in concern and demands are negatively correlated as illus-
trated by the following example.Example 1. Consider two CSNS P1 = (N, (Xi)i2N,c,p,g1,ei)i2N), and
P2 = (N, (Xi)i2N,c,p,g2, (ei)i2N) such that N = {1,2}, c = 1, p = 2, g1 < g2.
Let X1 be normally distributed with mean l > 0, and let
X2 = al  X1 with a > 1. In other words, X1 and X2 are negatively
correlated. Therefore, XN is deterministic demand with realization
al.
It is straightforward to validate that vP1 ðNÞ ¼ vP2 ðNÞ ¼ ðp cÞ
al, and it follows from Proposition 1 that vP1 ðfigÞ > vP2 ðfigÞ for all
i 2 N. Let x 2 CoreðvP1 Þ. Since x1 þ x2 ¼ vP1 ðNÞ and x1 P vP1 ðf1gÞ,
we derive that x2 6 vP
1 ðNÞ  vP1 ðf1gÞ. Consider the payoff vector
y ¼ ðvP2 ðf1gÞ;vP2 ðNÞ  vP2 ðf1gÞÞ 2 CoreðvP2 Þ. Then there is no
x 2 CoreðvP1 Þ such that x2P y2, since x2 6 vP1 ðNÞ  vP1 ðf1gÞ <
vP2 ðNÞ  vP2 ðf1gÞ for all x 2 CoreðvP1 Þ. So pair of games
ðN;vP1 ;vP2 Þ does not have MP1. 
Before presenting our second set of results, we introduce more
notation and we turn our focus to the situations with independent
normally distributed demand. Inmany practical situations, demand
can be modeled as normal distribution and these distributions will
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the variability in demand results from the local factors. Another
realistic scenario is that the retailers commonly use point forecast-
ing methods, the error of which follows normal distribution. As the
error results from independent processes, these cases can be realis-
tically modeled as independent normally distributed demand.
Consider a CSNS P = (N, (Xi)i2N,c,p,g, (ei)i2N) with Xi having inde-
pendent normal distribution N(li,ri). Furthermore, assume that
FSð
P
i2SeiÞ 6 1 c=ðpþ gÞ for all S # N. This assumption indicates
that the dedicated stock levels are not imposing any coalition to or-
der more than the optimal order quantity without any restrictions.
However, the dedicated stock levels are still important because
they restrict the allocations after demand realization. Consider
coalition S. Since optimal order quantity for coalition S satisﬁes
FSðqÞ ¼ 1 c=ðpþ gÞ we know that qP
P
i2Sei and hence qS ¼ q.
Since Xi’s are independent and normally distributed, XS is normally
distributed with parameters lS ¼
P
i2Sli and r2S ¼
P
i2Sr2. There-
fore, q ¼ lS þ k1c=ðpþgÞrS, where k1c/(p+g) is the unique number
such that the standard normal cumulative distribution function
H satisﬁesH(k1c/(p+g)) = 1  c/(p + g). Let (N,vP) be the associated
newsvendor game. Then, the proﬁt of coalition S is given by
vPðSÞ ¼ cqS þ plS  ðpþ gÞrSGðk1c=ðpþgÞÞ;
where GðuÞ ¼ R1u ð1HðxÞÞdx. We remark that lS + k1c/(p+g)rS and
lS  rSG(k1c/(p+g)) are the optimal order quantity and expected
sales under optimal order quantity for coalition S, respectively.
We expect them to be positive in a meaningful newsvendor
situation.
The following lemma follows from Theorem 2 of Özen et al.
(2011).
Lemma 2. Let P = (N, (Xi)i2N,c,p,g, (ei)i2N) with Xi having indepen-
dent normal distribution such that FSð
P
i2SeiÞ 6 1 c=ðpþ gÞ for all
S # N be a CSNS. The associated newsvendor game (N,vP) is convex.
The next theorem considers newsvendor situations with an
arbitrary number of players.
Theorem 11. Let P1 = (N,(Xi)i2N,c1,p1,g1, (ei)i2N) and P2 = (N,(Xi)i2N,
c2,p2,g2, (ei)i2N) with Xi having independent normal distribution such
that li  riGðk1c2=ðp2þg2ÞÞP 0 and li þ k1c2=ðp2þg2Þri P 0 for all
i 2 N; FSð
P
i2SeiÞ 6 1 c2=ðp2 þ g2Þ and FSð
P
i2SeiÞ 6 1 c1=ðp1
þg1Þ for all S # N, p1P p2, c1 6 c2, and g1 6 g2 be two CSNSs. Let
ðN; vP1 Þ and ðN;vP2 Þ be the newsvendor games associated with P1
and P2, respectively. Then, pair of newsvendor games ðN;vP1 ;vP2 Þ
has MP1 and MP2.Proof. From Lemma 2 and Theorem 5, it follows that ðN;vP1 ;vP2 Þ
has MP2.
From Theorem 4 and Lemma 2, it is enough to show that
vP1 ðNÞ  vP2 ðNÞP vP1 ðSÞ  vP2 ðSÞ for all S # N. We use a similar
technique as in the proof of Theorem 10.
Consider coalition S # N. Deﬁne the following generic proﬁt
function
dSðp; c; gÞÞ ¼ cqSðp; c; gÞ þ plS  ðpþ gÞrSGðk1c=ðpþgÞÞ; ð2Þ
where qS(p,c,g) = lS + k1c/(p+g)rS. Therefore, FS(qS(p)) = 1  c/(p + g).
Then,
vP1 ðSÞ ¼ dSðp1; c1; g1Þ:
Moreover,
vP1 ðSÞvP2 ðSÞ¼
Z p1
p2
@dSðp;c2;g2Þ
@p

Z c2
c1
@dSðp1;c;g2Þ
@c

Z g2
g1
@dSðp1;c1;gÞ
@g
:From the envelope theorem, it follows that
@dSðp;c2;g2Þ
@p
¼lSrSGðk1c2=ðpþg2ÞÞ;
@dSðp1;c;g2Þ
@c
¼qSðp1;c;g2Þ
and
@dSðp1; c1; gÞ
@g
¼ rSGðk1c1=ðp1þgÞÞ:
To complete the proof, we will show that
@dNðp; c2; g2Þ
@p
P
@dSðp; c2; g2Þ
@p
for all p 2 ½p2;p1;
 @dNðp
1; c; g2Þ
@c
P  @dSðp
1; c; g2Þ
@c
for all c 2 ½c1; c2; and
 @dNðp
1; c1; gÞ
@g
P  @dSðp
1; c1; gÞ
@g
for all g 2 ½g1; g2:
@dNðp; c2; g2Þ
@p
 @dSðp; c
2; g2Þ
@p
¼ lN  rNGðk1c2=ðpþg2ÞÞ  lS
þ rSGðk1c2=ðpþg2ÞÞ
¼ lNnS  ðrN  rSÞGðk1c2=ðpþg2ÞÞ
P lNnS  rNnSGðk1c2=ðpþg2ÞÞ
P
X
i2NnS
ðli  riGðk1c2=ðpþg2ÞÞÞ
P 0 for all p 2 ½p2; p1:
The ﬁrst and second inequality hold becauseﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
a2 þ b2
q
6 aþ b for all a; b 2 Rþ: ð3Þ
The last inequality follows from the assumption that
li  riGðk1c2=ðp2þg2ÞÞP 0 for all i 2 N and because G(u) is a decreas-
ing function.
First, suppose that H1(1  c/(p1 + g2))P 0. Then
 @dNðp
1; c; g2Þ
@c
þ @dSðp
1; c; g2Þ
@c
¼ lN þ k1c=ðp1þg2ÞrN  lS
 k1c=ðp1þg2ÞrS
¼ lNnS þ k1c=ðp1þg2ÞðrN  rSÞP 0:
The inequality holds since k1c=ðp1þg2Þ P 0 and rNP rS. Suppose that
H1(1  c/(p1 + g2)) 6 0. Then
 @dNðp
1; c; g2Þ
@c
þ @dSðp
1; c; g2Þ
@c
¼ lN þ k1c=ðp1þg2ÞrN  lS
 k1c=ðp1þg2ÞrS
¼ lNnS þ k1c=ðp1þg2ÞðrN  rSÞ
P lNnS þ k1c=ðp1þg2ÞrNnS
P
X
i2NnS
ðli þ k1c=ðp1þg2ÞriÞP 0
The ﬁrst and second inequality follows from k1c=ðp1þg2Þ 6 0 and (3).
The last inequality follows from the assumption that
li þ k1c2=ðp2þg2Þri P 0 for all i 2 N.
 @dNðp
1; c1; gÞ
@g
þ @dSðp
1; c1; gÞ
@g
¼ rNGðk1c1=ðp1þgÞÞ
 rSGðk1c1=ðp1þgÞÞ
P 0 for all g 2 ½g1; g2:
The inequality holds since rNP rS. This concludes the proof. h3.2.2. Dedicated stock levels
In this section, we study the changes in retailers’ dedicated
stock levels. We ﬁrst give examples of a pair and a singleton pair
Table 3
The optimal order quantities (Example 2).
qS,⁄ {1,2,3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1} {2} {3}
C1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1
C2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
Table 4
The (single deviation) pair of cooperative games (Example 2).
S vC1 ðSÞ vC2 ðSÞ
{1,2,3} 1.718 1.718
{1,2} 0.82 0.8
{1,3} 1.2 1.2
{2,3} 1.2 1.2
{1} 0.4 0.4
{2} 0.4 0.4
{3} 0.8 0.8
Table 5
The demand distributions (Example 3).
Player x P(X = x)
1 0 0.7
1 0.3
2 0 0.5
1 0.5
3 0 0.4
1 0.6
Table 6
The optimal order quantities (Example 3).
S,⁄
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ties. Then, we focus on a class of newsvendor situations with nor-
mal demand distributions and show that pairs of newsvendor
games associated with this class satisfy MP1.
The following examples show that in general games associated
with newsvendor situations are not guaranteed to have any of the
monotonicity properties.
Example 2. Consider two newsvendor situations C1 ¼ ðN; ðXiÞi2N;
ðciÞi2N ; ðpiÞi2N; ðgiÞi2N ; e1i
 
i2NÞ and C2 ¼ ðN; ðXiÞi2N; ðciÞi2N ; ðpiÞi2N;
ðgiÞi2N ; ðe2i Þi2NÞ such that N = {1,2,3}, ci = 1, pi = 2, gi = 0 for all
i 2 N, e1 = (1,0,0) and e2 = (1,1,0). The demand of the players are
discrete, and independently distributed. The distribution functions
are given in Table 2.
The optimal order quantities of the coalitions for both situations
are given in Table 3.
Note that order quantity 1 for coalition {1,2} in situation C2 is
not feasible because of the dedicated stock levels of players 1 and
2. Consider C1 and coalition {1,2}. Then the value of this coalition
can be calculated as follows:
vC1 ðf1;2gÞ ¼ 1  1þ 2  0:91 ¼ 0:82;
where 0.91 is the probability of having a positive total demand.
Using similar calculations, we ﬁnd the values of coalitions pre-
sented in Table 4.
Hence, ðN;vC1 Þ and ðN; vC2 Þ only differ in the value of coalition
{1,2}. Let x 2 CoreðvC1 Þ. Since x1 + x2 + x3 = 1.718 and
x1 + x2P 0.82, we derive that x3 6 0.898. Consider the payoff
vector y ¼ ð0:4; 0:4;0:918Þ 2 CoreðvC2 Þ. Then there is no
x 2 CoreðvC1 Þ such that x3P y3, since x3 6 0.898 for all
x 2 CoreðvC1 Þ. So pair of games ðN;vC1 ;vC2 Þ (and single deviation
pair of games ðN;vC1 ;vC2 ;1Þ) does not have MP1 (and MP3). q {1,2,3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1} {2} {3}
C1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
C2 2 1 1 2 0 1 1Example 3. Consider two newsvendor situations C1 ¼ ðN; ðXiÞi2N;
ðciÞi2N; ðpiÞi2N; ðgiÞi2N; e1i
 
i2NÞ and C2 ¼ ðN; ðXiÞi2N; ðciÞi2N; ðpiÞi2N;
ðgiÞi2N; e2i
 
i2NÞ such that N = {1,2,3}, ci = 1, pi = 2, gi = 0 for all i 2 N,
e1 = (0,0,1) and e2 = (0,1,1). Note that player 2 is the deviating
player. The demand of the players are discrete and independently
distributed. The distribution functions are given in Table 5.
The optimal order quantities of the coalitions for both situations
are given in Table 6. Note that order quantity 1 for coalitions
{1,2,3} and {2,3} in situation C2 is not feasible because of the
dedicated stock levels of players 1, 2 and 3. Using similar
calculations as in Example 2, we derive ðN;vC1 Þ and ðN;vC2 Þ as
given in Table 7. Let y 2 CoreðvC2 Þ. Then
y1 þ y2 P 0:3; ð4Þ
y1 þ y3 P 0:44; ð5ÞX
i2N
yi ¼ 0:62: ð6Þ
Adding (4) and (5), we ﬁnd that 2y1 + y2 + y3P 0.74. Therefore,
using (6), y1P 0.12. Moreover, from (4) and (6), y3 6 0.32.Table 2
The demand distributions (Example 2).
Player x P(X = x)
1 0 0.3
1 0.7
2 0 0.3
1 0.7
3 0 0.1
1 0.9Consider payoff vector x = (0.02,0.28,0.42). It is easy to check
that x 2 CoreðvC1 Þ. Since x1 = 0.02 and y1P 0.12 for all y 2 CoreðvC2 Þ,
there is no y 2 CoreðvC2 Þ such that y 6 x. Hence, the pair of games
ðN;vC1 ;vC2 Þ does not satisfy MP2.
Moreover, we know that for any payoff vector y 2 CoreðvC2 Þ; y3
6 0:32. Consider payoff vector x ¼ ð0:02;0:28; 0:42Þ 2 CoreðvC1 Þ.
Since x3P 0.32 and y3 6 0.32 for all y 2 CoreðvC2 Þ, we conclude that
x R CoreðvC2 Þ and there is no y 2 CoreðvC2 Þ such that y3P x3. Note
that player 3 is not the deviating player. Therefore, the single
deviation pair of games ðN;vC1 ;vC2 ;2Þ does not satisfy MP4
either. h
In the remainder of this section, we focus on a class of newsven-
dor situations such that MP1 is satisﬁed by the associated class of
games. Consider a newsvendor situation C = (N, (Xi)i2N, (ci)i 2N,
(pi)i2N, (gi)i2N, (ei)i2N) with independent normally distributed de-
mands Xi  N(li,r2) for all i 2 N, ci = c for all i 2 N, pi = p for all
i 2 N, gi = g for all i 2 N and ei = li + kr with k 2 R for all i 2 N. Note
Table 7
The (single deviation) pair of cooperative games (Example 3).
S vC1 vC2
{1,2,3} 0.72 0.62
{1,2} 0.3 0.3
{1,3} 0.44 0.44
{2,3} 0.6 0.2
{1} 0 0
{2} 0 0
{3} 0.2 0.2
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p and g, non-identical mean demands, and identical variances. This
case represents situationswhere the retailers’ forecast errors follow
identical independent normal distributions. Moreover, we remark
that for all k 2 R; ei ¼ li þ kr guarantees the same probability of
stockout (usually denoted as service measure P1) for each retailer
i 2 N. We denote a newsvendor situation with normal demand
(NSND) byP = (N, (li)i2N,r,c,p,g,k). In a NSND, there is no difference
in satisfying demands for different retailers in terms of total proﬁt of
a coalition because of common purchasing cost and selling price.
Therefore, the proﬁt function of coalition S can bewritten as follows
pSðqSÞ ¼ EXS ½c  qS þ ðpþ gÞminfqS; g  glS; ð7Þ
where XS ¼
P
i2SXi and lS ¼
P
i2Sli. Since Xi’s are independent and
normally distributed, XS is normally distributed with parameters
lS and r2S ¼ jSjr2. In inventory literature, it is known that EXS ½c
qþ ðpþ gÞminðq; Þ (the proﬁt function of newsvendor problem
without any dedicated stock) is a concave function and the opti-
mum q maximizing this function satisﬁes FSðqÞ ¼ 1 c=ðpþ gÞ,
where FS is the cumulative distribution function of XS. Since XS is
normally distributed, q ¼ lS þ k1c=ðpþgÞrS, where k1c/(p+g) is the un-
ique number such that the standard normal cumulative distribution
function H satisﬁes H(k1c/(p+g)) = 1  c/(p + g). Since EXS ½c  q
þðpþ gÞminðq; Þ is concave, it follows immediately that the opti-
mal order quantity of coalition S is the maximum of the optimal or-
der quantity of the newsvendor problem without any dedicated
stock and the sum of the dedicated stock levels of the retailers in
S, i.e., qS = max{lS + k1c/(p+g)rS, lS + kjSjr}. Let (N,vP) be the associ-
ated newsvendor game. Then, the proﬁt of coalition S is given by
vPðSÞ ¼ ðpþ g  cÞqS  ðpþ gÞrS
Z qSlS
rS
1
HðxÞdx glS:
The following proposition provides a property of the newsvendor
games associated with NSNDs.
Proposition 2. LetP = (N, (li)i2N,r, c,p,g,k) be a NSND. Let (N,vP) be
the associated newsvendor game. Then, (N,vP) is convex if k 6
k1c=ðpþgÞ=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃjNjp .
The following lemma shows a relation for pairs of newsvendor
games associated with NSNDs.
Lemma 3. Let P1 = (N,(li)i2N,r, c,p,g,k1) and P2 = (N,(li)i2N,r, c,p,
g,k2) with c/(p + g) 6 1/2 and k1 6 k2 be two NSNDs. Let ðN; vP1 Þ and
ðN; vP2 Þ be the newsvendor games associated with P1 and P2,
respectively. Then,
vP1 ðTÞ  vP2 ðTÞP vP1 ðSÞ  vP2 ðSÞ for all S  T#N:
In other words, if the retailers in an NSND decrease their dedicated
stock levels by the same amount, the contribution of these changes
to a coalition is increasing in the size of the coalition.
The following Theorem follows directly from Proposition 2,
Lemma 3, Theorems 2 and 4.
Theorem 12. Let P1 = (N,(li)i2N,r, c,p,g,k1) and P2 = (N,(li)i2N,
r, c,p,g,k2) with c=ðpþ gÞ 6 1=2; k1 6 k1c=ðpþgÞ=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃjNjp and k1 6 k2
be two NSNDs. Let ðN; vP1 Þ and ðN;vP2 Þ be the newsvendor games
associated with P1 and P2, respectively. Then, pair of newsvendor
games ðN;vP1 ;vP2 Þ has MP1. If jNj 2 {2,3}, the condition k1 6
k1c=ðpþgÞ=
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃjNjp is not required for pair of newsvendor games
ðN; vP1 ;vP2 Þ to have MP1.4. Conclusion
In this study, we considered proﬁt division problems arising
from situations where multiple retailers can order jointly andallocate their order after demand realization to beneﬁt from inven-
tory centralization. However, this cooperation is subject to some
limitations. Being in a cooperation, the retailers may impose dedi-
cated stock levels to prevent themselves from possible unwanted
situations. These restrictions can also be motivated by service level
constraints.
We studied this problem from a cooperative game theoretical
point of view and we especially focused on the core concept. Given
a situation, the core concept is quite powerful for predicting the
outcome of the cooperative game since it results in all stable divi-
sions of total proﬁt. In this paper, we ﬁrst investigated core non-
emptiness for the newsvendor games with dedicated stock and
we showed that these games have non-empty cores. This result
is important as it shows that dedicated stock restrictions, as spec-
iﬁed in this study, do not affect the existence of a stable proﬁt divi-
sion. Afterwards, we carried the analysis beyond the single-period
structure of the newsvendor situation and investigated what
would happen in a dynamic environment where system parame-
ters and restrictions are expected to change. Although the core
concept can be powerful in a given situation, it has less to say when
the conditions and underlying data of the situation change. To ad-
dress this issue, we worked with four monotonicity properties
regarding core, each reﬂecting special fairness arguments that
the retailers would follow in a new situation. MP1 (MP2) suggests
that if the values of the coalitions increase (decrease) because of a
change in all retailers’ parameters, it is possible to ﬁnd a new core
allocation such that none of the retailers gets less (more) in the
new situation. MP3 and MP4 deal with the changes caused by a
speciﬁc player. The sufﬁcient conditions in Table 1 indicate that
the monotonicity notions hold more naturally for games with at
most 3 players, but more structural conditions (e.g., convexity)
are involved for games with more players. The conditions for
MP3 and MP4 are easier to check and valuable to make a case by
case analysis.
Afterwards, we identiﬁed several classes of newsvendor games
where MP1 and MP2 hold. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study
considering the effect of dynamic changes in the environment on
the cooperation in newsvendor setting. Our results can be summa-
rized as follows: Regarding the cost parameters, we focused on the
newsvendor situations under symmetric cost assumptions and
showed that up to 3 retailers MP1 is satisﬁed under changes in cost
parameters p and c regardless of joint demand distribution. For
penalty cost g, such a result does not hold in general under nega-
tively correlated demand. However, this result extends to games
with an arbitrary number of retailers for all cost parameters if de-
mands are independent and normally distributed. Moreover, MP2
is naturally satisﬁed in these situations. All of these results suggest
that MP1 and MP2 are naturally satisﬁed for a fairly general class of
newsvendor situations if the changes are caused by the cost
parameters. However, MP1 under changes in penalty costs is sen-
sitive to the correlation structure of demand.
Regarding dedicated stock levels, we show that MP1 is satisﬁed
if the retailers forecast errors follow identical independent normal
distribution and they work with similar service levels. Next to this,
we provided several counterexamples in which none of the mono-
tonicity conditions are satisﬁed. Hence, monotonicity properties
are sensitive to changes in dedicated stock levels and they are
not as naturally satisﬁed as they do for cost parameters. This im-
plies that in cooperative newsvendor situations priorities have to
be selected. Either one puts more emphasis on ending up with a
core element, essentially disregarding unfair payoff disturbances
as a result of changes in dedicated stock levels, or one should de-
part from the core concept (as a whole).
A natural follow-up to this work would consequently be to look
for solutions (e.g., set-valued or single-valued) that satisfy similar
monotonicity requirements. If core-conditions are considered
U. Özen et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 218 (2012) 416–425 425equally desirable, this restricts attention to subsets or elements of
the core. An alternative direction of research is further reﬁnement
of the sufﬁcient and necessary conditions required for monotonic-
ity for the newsvendor situation described here.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2011.11.021.
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